Tuesday, February 16, 2010
Truth With An Error Range.
Monday, February 8, 2010
What Now?
What Now?
On January 19th, 2010, the good people of Massachusetts were voting to elect a US Senator to replace the deceased Ted Kennedy, a Democrat who held the seat since 1962. Ever since the Republican candidate Scott Brown was announced the winner of that election, the Democrats have been in a crisis that is threatening to completely dismantle the young Obama administration.
First some background is due. Prior to this election, the Democrats (in combination with the independent Joe Lieberman) held 60 seats in the Senate, and the Republicans held 40. Because a Republican won the seat, the Democrats lost their 60-vote majority. Now, in most legislative bodies, a 59% majority is still a perfectly good majority to pass a bill. Not so in the US Senate, where the rules require that in order to take a vote on a bill, the debate has to be formally brought to conclusion by 60 or more votes. Therefore, losing the 60th seat amounted to losing the ability to pass anything in the Senate. While Democrats technically still have a majority of seats in the Senate, what matters more is the other 41 seats occupied by Senators that represent 37% of the US population, who can bring the Senate to a halt any time they wish. If you thought that the US was a representative democracy, you might want to rethink that.
There is no area that illustrates better the effects this has had on American politics than healthcare. Prior to the special election, before the Democrats lost their 60th seat in the Senate, both the House of Representatives and the Senate passed their version of reform. Like they would with any other bill, after passing their respective versions, the representatives of the two bodies started negotiating a compromise bill that could be put to vote and passed in both chambers of Congress, thus finally enacting health reform, after nearly a year of hearings, negotiations and compromises - and a century of failed attempts. Indeed, when the President set the date for his first State of the Union speech for January 27th, 2010, it was commonly expected that he will list health reform as one of his first year accomplishments.
The situation changed dramatically on January 19th when a Republican won the Massachusetts senate seat. The implications of this loss quickly reverberated throughout DC. On a practical level, the loss of the 60 vote supermajority meant that the standard route that everyone envisioned prior to the election - passing a compromise bill in both chambers - was no longer a viable option, since the Democrats were now one vote short of the necessary supermajority in the Senate. As a result, the only option to still pass reform was for the House to simply adopt the bill already passed by the Senate prior to the special election. (Remember, as long as both chambers of US Congress pass the same legislation, it becomes law.) With a Democratic majority in the House and a simple majority required to pass a measure, one might think that concluding this saga would be a breeze.
However, what happened in Massachusetts had a much more profound impact than simply losing a seat in the Senate. With a solidly Democratic state like Massachusetts suddenly voting Republican, the narrative that quickly developed in the media was that the election in Massachusetts was basically a litmus test for Obama, his administration and the Democrats at large. The failure of a Democrat to secure the seat despite hugely favorable position in the polls just a few weeks prior to the election was being interpreted by many as a sign of meaningful dissatisfaction in the electorate. Even more specifically to healthcare, many commentators insisted that popular opposition to the current reform effort occurring in the Congress was behind the downfall of the Democratic candidate. Whether or not these theories have any truth to them, it is understandable that all Democrats in the Congress must have asked themselves what this means for them and their prospects during the midterm elections in November. After the loss in Massachusetts, which no one saw coming, are they risking their reelection by voting for the health bill? Something along these lines must have been happening, because by January 21st, the speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi declared that she doesn't have the votes to pass the Senate bill.
This chain of events clearly had an effect on Obama's State of the Union speech. Instead of taking a victory lap for passing health reform, Obama felt it necessary to urge the legislators: "Do not walk away from reform. Not now. Not when we are so close. Let us find a way to come together and finish the job for the American people." Certainly, these are not words of someone confident in the imminent passage of the bill; on the other hand, some optimists in the pro-reform crowd might have rejoiced: he still cares about reform, despite what happened in Massachusetts! Clearly, Obama did not drop the issue entirely; however, the fact that he spent barely 5 minutes in the second half of his 69 minute speech on something that he and the Congress spent a whole year deliberating would suggest that he would rather not risk being remembered as the president who went down in flames in his first term due to his aggressive insistence on health reform. Instead, Obama used the speech to outline new priorities - the economy, financial sector reform, and the deficit.
At this point, many have written off health reform as dead. The irony of the situation is that not many envisioned the process getting this close - and its path certainly was not easy. After the August recess and a wave of attacks from all sides this column all but predicted its failure. Which is why after passing through both chambers of the Congress, it seemed all but inevitable and very few could see what would stop its momentum - until that fatal election in Massachusetts.
So what does this all mean for Obama, the administration and Democrats generally? On the one hand, it is hard to make a bulletproof argument that the Democrats should keep on marching fearlessly without a second thought about public preferences - an arrogance that was the staple of the last two administrations. On the other hand, it is not exactly obvious that letting health reform fail will save them from the anger that is brewing in the American public and that was at least part of the reason for the Democratic loss in Massachusetts. Yes, health reform has become less popular - a quick look at the polls can prove that (http://www.pollster.com/polls/us/healthplan.php). Still, will simply reversing course on health care be the saving grace for the Democrats? Unlikely. A recent survey by Public Policy Polling shows that the Democrats' chances at the midterms are not necessary better if reform fails - in fact, fewer people are likely to vote Democrat if reform fails. It seems that whatever damage health care is doing to the Democrats has already been done and retreating from it now can only do more damage. As Jonathan Cohn at the New Republic pointed out, letting reform die would have a threefold effect: first, it will discredit the party in the eyes of those who supported the effort - their base; second, it won't prevent the Republicans from campaigning against them as supporters of reform (they voted for it once before!) - and flip-floppers (they keep changing their minds!), and third, it will rob them of the chance to point to one big accomplishment. The last piece is the most critical one, not only in a symbolic sense (passing bills means "getting things done") but also in a practical sense, that is, there were enough concrete positive measures that would become effective immediately and be perceive positively. And so, even if the public is now riled up against reform, once they started experiencing its early benefits, they would quite possibly appreciate it.
Thinking about the current situation more broadly, if the result of the special election is the failure of health care, I deeply worry about the next 3 years and the ability of this administration to do anything at a time when crucial reforms are desperately needed in America. For if this one road block has the power to create such paralysis among the Democrats that they are not able to take the roads that are still widely open to them to deliver on a key domestic priority, what are their chances to tackle their next agenda items that are just as important yet controversial, like the economy, financial sector reform, climate change? And more importantly, if they fail on this one occasion, why should they deserve to even have the chance to try? After all, how can the country and indeed the whole world face the challenges of the post-Great Recession era with an impotent US government? My message is simple: wake up, Democrats, or die.
Friday, December 18, 2009
30 million reasons.
Wednesday, December 9, 2009
You Know You Made It When ..
Monday, December 7, 2009
Boeuf Bourguignon.
Thursday, December 3, 2009
Clueless.
Wednesday, December 2, 2009
Dubai.
Friday, November 27, 2009
Marie's Secret?
Wednesday, November 25, 2009
Tough First Years.
Human Inventions.
Tuesday, November 24, 2009
False Choice.
Friday, October 30, 2009
Suprise!
"Which of these would you prefer – (a plan that includes some form of government-sponsored health insurance for people who can’t get affordable private insurance, but is approved without support from Republicans in Congress); or (a plan that is approved with support from Republicans in Congress, but does not include any form of government-sponsored health insurance for people who can’t get affordable private insurance)?"Good to know that Americans care more about the substance of the bill than they care about holding hands with their evil twins on the other side of the political spectrum. Because, really, bipartisanship doesn't pay your health care premiums when you get fired and the insurance companies denies you coverage because you're pregnant or diabetic.
Fifty one percent said they preferred the public option; 37 percent said they preferred a bill with some support from Republicans in Congress. Six percent said neither and seven percent expressed no opinion."
Thursday, October 29, 2009
Ridiculous Conclusions.
Sometimes the tactical decisions that Obama makes make one wonder what the man really believes in. And, increasingly, they don't even seem to produce their purported goals.
When the President received criticism for being the first president since 1991 not to receive the Dalai Lama during his most recent visit to Washington in October, the press was promptly educated by his senior adviser Valerie Jerrett that "it is not a signal of any lack of commitment to human rights .. that's a ridiculous conclusion to draw." At the same time, Jerrett admitted it is "a fair point to make" that the decision to postpone the meeting was made out of respect to Chinese sensitivities to Tibet. In other words, it was a tactical move, not a principled move; the appearance of bending over backwards to please the Chinese should not be disconcerting - the President knows what he's doing - trust him.
To be sure, America's dependence on China is hardly a secret. With some $2 trillion in US government bonds, China is the largest holder of the US debt and thus the largest funder of its massive deficits. Amicable relations with China are therefore a clear priority for US foreign policy. And yet, this sort of diplomatic calculus could hardly justify not meeting with the Dalai Lama. For one thing, even George W. Bush received him during his visit in 2007 (and awarded him the Congressional Gold Medal) and other Congressional leaders, including Nancy Pelosi, met with him during his most recent visit in October. Of course, this was enough to make the Chinese dissatisfied: shortly thereafter, China accused the US of interfering with their internal affairs. In the end, Obama's tactical move not only enraged those who think the US should take a principled stand on human rights in China, but it also failed to deliver the goal of pleasing the Chinese government, instead encouraging them to make even more ambitious demands.
To anyone who has been watching Obama's presidency with a little bit of a critical eye, this scenario looks eerily familiar. In fact, we witnessed a similar tactical blunder even before the Obamas moved into the White House, when then president-elect asked Pastor Rick Warren to deliver the invocation at his inauguration ceremony. For the sake of context, this choice was controversial due to Warren's widely publicized support for Proposition 8, an anti-gay marriage ballot measure in California during the November election. The choice of an extremely conservative pastor was widely seen as Obama's attempt to reach out to the conservative base and passionately criticized by his largely progressive supporters. In the end, it did very little to improve national cohesion (as evidenced by the largest partisan gap in Obama's job approval ratings, according to PEW) and at the same time offended his socially progressive supporters.
Fast forwarding to last summer, we saw the same pattern emerge during the health care reform debate. As the debate quickly focused in on the question of the public plan - a government run insurance option - the legislators increasingly looked to the White House for guidance. At this critical juncture, in an apparent attempt to bring some Republican support on board, the President and his advisors, through interviews and press conferences communicated the message that while the President supports the public plan, it is "not the entirety of health-care reform" and "not the essential element". Ironically, this telegraphed flexibility did not make Republicans any more constructive in the reform efforts. In fact, despite the president's soft-pedaling on one of the key components of reform, it seems likely that if reform passes, it will happen with no Republican votes.
Obama's willingness to make sacrifices to achieve greater goals - Dalai Lama vs the Chinese, progressive issues vs national cohesion, public option vs bipartisan support - is theoretically understandable as shrewd political calculus. However, it is then imperative to judge his effectiveness in making these trade-offs and, so far, it seems to be very limited. In fact, it seems that every time the President decides to give something up, he receives very little in return. The impression it creates is one of an almost pathological desire to please his opponents even if this disregards the sensitivities of those that might be hurt in the process.
It is certainly understandable how his predilection for compromise and trade-offs would make Obama appealing to a certain committee in Norway. At home, however, he is testing the patience of his liberal base. It is ironic that one of the common criticisms of George W Bush was his inflexibility. These days, Democrats sometimes wish that Obama would exhibit some of that stubbornness, at least when it comes to defending their interests – the promises he made a year ago.
20 Years.
So what happened in 1989 can only be understood on the basis of a scrupulous, detailed chronological reconstruction of intended and unintended effects, in multiple directions on multiple stages, day by day, and sometimes—as on the evening of November 9 in Berlin—minute by minute. The reporting or misreporting of events, especially by television, is itself a vital part of the causal chain. When a trusted, avuncular presenter on the 10:30 PM West German television news declared that "the gates in the Wall are wide open" they were not yet wide open; but this report helped to make them so, since it increased the flood of East Berliners (who watched and were more inclined to believe West German television) hoping to get through the frontier crossings to the West, and the crowds of West Berliners coming to greet them on the other side.An erroneous report on Radio Free Europe that a student called Martin Šmid had been killed, in the suppression of the November 17, 1989, student demonstration in Prague, helped to swell the protesting crowds in the first days of the Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia. (In what seems to me the best, and certainly the most amusing, of the retrospective chronicles, György Dalos tells how the student came home the next evening to be told by a somewhat agitated father that he was reportedly dead.)
Nor did Bush set much store by bearded dissidents who looked like something out of Berkeley in the 1960s. Victor Sebestyen, in a book full of sharp snapshots and crisp narrative, has a well-sourced account of the President meeting with the leading Hungarian dissident János Kis in Budapest in July 1989, and subsequently telling aides, "These really aren't the right guys to be running the place." Much better to stick with a preppy reform communist.
Gosh, WTF.
Monday, October 19, 2009
Health Reform in America – Why It Should, Could and Probably Won't Happen
Health Reform in America – Why It Should, Could and Probably Won't Happen
The story of US health reform is a complicated one and a thorough analysis of the topic is beyond the scope and scale of this column. However, it has become increasingly difficult to ignore given the prominence it has risen to in the last few months. Not only has it become the number one domestic issue that the president, lawmakers, lobbyists, news reporters and policy analysts are occupied with, but it is also quickly becoming the gauge for the Obama administration's success and potentially one of the determinants of the mid-term Congressional elections (in November 2010) and the next presidential election (in November 2012). Even more broadly, it has been a fascinating study in the functioning (some would say, malfunctioning) of the US political system and its many quirks. In short, for anyone interested in US politics, there are many reasons to care about health reform.
So what is all the fuss about? Why all the talk about reforming a system which is defined by spectacular innovation and some of the most advanced treatments and therapies? The standard answers to that question typically involve three aspects of the system: access, cost and outcomes. Quite simply, with all its high technology and innovation, the US health system leaves many people uninsured, and despite being the most expensive in the world, it produces worse outcomes. Specifically, while almost a fifth of non-elderly Americans don’t have any health insurance, the cost per capita is roughly twice that of most developed countries, and yet life expectancy is remarkably below average while infant mortality is astonishingly high. Underneath all these characteristics lies the fact that health care in America is an amalgam of disjointed systems of financing and delivery with little coordination of care, no incentives for prevention and wellness and plenty of room for duplication and errors.
Interestingly, despite the obvious difficulty of the task and the discouraging historical precedent, as recently as in June, there was a widespread sense of confidence on Capitol Hill that this time around things are different and something will get done. For starters, in the 15 years since the last attempt, healthcare spending has ballooned 160%, while the ranks of the uninsured have swelled from 41 million to 47 million. In fact, according to the CNN exit polls from the presidential election, while the economy was the number one issue for the vast majority of voters, healthcare ranked as number one for as many as did the issues of terrorism and Iraq. Even more specifically, two thirds of voters said they were worried about health care costs (and 60% of them voted in favor of Obama). In addition to having an apparent mandate and greater urgency, the new Democratic administration was also equipped with an expanded Democratic majority in both chambers of Congress - the first time such power alignment occurred since 1993. Perhaps more importantly, unlike in 1993, there seemed to be an agreement among key stakeholders, including the for-profit healthcare industry, about the need for reform. This was a major difference from the Clinton era, when the lobbying and advertising efforts of the health insurers, pharmaceutical manufacturers and doctors killed reform in its infancy. The new administration, trying to prevent Clinton’s mistakes, kept the process as open and collaborative as possible so as not to ignite hostile opposition from any of the key groups, instead making deals with each of them. The premise was that if we can fix the system and expand coverage, all of the participants will benefit and should therefore contribute in their own ways towards making the overhaul affordable. In short, for a very long time it seemed like the stars were aligning for the impossible to occur.
In hindsight, it was only a question of time when the fairy tale would turn into a mean fight. Once the committees in Congress started drafting bills – there are 3 of them in the House of Representatives and 2 in the Senate with jurisdiction over health care – the details got in the way of noble goals. The reality is that while most agree on the need for reform, there are numerous starkly different ideas about both how it should be accomplished and paid for – and each of them has a different set of proponents and enemies. The obvious goal is to find a solution that upsets the smallest number of participants – which isn’t very consistent with the objective of revamping 16% of the US economy. To make matters more complicated, the differences of opinion do not necessarily fall along party lines, rendering the Democratic majorities in Congress largely useless. As an example, a major portion of the debate has been around the possible introduction of a government-run health insurance option that would compete with private health insurers. While progressive democrats perceive this as an essential part of the reform, the conservative block of the party is vehemently against it. Recognizing the complexity of these diverging interests, Obama has been smart in keeping his demands as vague as possible and instead putting out broad parameters for reform – it has to expand coverage, improve quality and save money. This strategic vagueness, however, didn’t prevent the opponents of reform from poking holes in the proposals and the proponents of different solutions from engaging in hostile debates.
And so here we are in August and the whole reform effort appears to be on life support. Why? If reform fails, history books will probably trace its death to the August congressional recess. The recess is a month-long break during which lawmakers typically go back home to meet with their constituents. Early on in the month it became clear that having a bunch of health care proposals sitting around for a month was like leaving a carton of milk on the table for a few days. The news became quickly dominated by reports of contentious town hall meetings in which lawmakers encountered anger and even violence, often fueled by outrage over the supposed attempt to nationalize healthcare and over particular provisions in the health care bills, some of which were completely made up. The famous example was the rumor that Obama’s reform would create government-run “death panels” that would determine which patients are worth living – which turned out to be a gross misrepresentation of actual proposals to include funding for voluntary end-of-life counseling. Another example of populist hysteria was the accusation that the reform will force preferential hiring of homosexual hospital administrators and includes funding for sex change operations, when in fact none of the proposals include any such language. Absurd or not, these protests have a good chance of making lawmakers uneasy about their support for reform especially if they are Democrats in conservative districts or states and thus vulnerable in the next election.
So does this mean that health care reform is dead? Probably not entirely. Obama has made the issue so central to his domestic policy that a complete failure could harm the future prospects of both his party and his own. However, given the lack of legislative will and mounting opposition in the electorate, the most viable alternative is to settle for some smaller incremental changes such as expanding some public programs like Medicaid to cover more poor people and children and pay for it by cutting spending in a few targeted areas. This would be very far from a comprehensive reform of financing and delivery of care, and it will certainly anger the progressive Democratic base. However, faced with the prospect of getting nothing at all, the progressives will likely take whatever “reform” they can get. In the end, it seems quite possible that this will all have been yet another exercise in the realpolitik in the US legislative process and perhaps another lesson for those who believed in Change: it’s slow, painful, full of compromise and ultimately not very satisfying.
Tuesday, August 25, 2009
Dear Mr. Collier,
Monday, August 3, 2009
Just Dance.
Just Dance.
The term green shoots in this context was coined by the Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke during an interview in March to describe what he believed were some early signs of economic recovery. Since then, many analysts have been obsessed with identifying these encouraging data points. Suddenly, it mattered less that many data points were still bad or worsening; it became fashionable to point out that as bad as things may seem – or deteriorating even – they are getting worse at a slower rate, the implication being that we are close to hitting a bottom. The market responded accordingly: between early March and the end of May, the S&P500 index has climbed 35%. And this sense of optimism has clearly infected American households: the Conference Board consumer confidence index in May showed a stunning improvement since the previous month to the highest level since last September, when the crisis broke out. Even more telling is the fact that the increase was driven by a pop in future expectations – to the highest level since December 2007, the month when this recession started. In other words, while people's assessment of the current situation is still not particularly rosy, their view of the future is as good as it was before the recession started. Similarly, in the stock market, one earnings report after another, investors have been looking through mediocre near term trends, and propping up prices of stocks in the hopes of an economic recovery.
Now, let me spell out my main source of skepticism clearly: none of the fundamental negative trends that were at the core of the downturn that clearly broke out last fall has reversed. Here's a quick survey of some macroeconomic factors: the housing prices keep going down (15% in April, according to National Association of Realtors, while the inventory of homes climbed 8.8% and mortgage delinquencies hit a record high, said Mortgage Bankers Association), the true health of banks remains unclear, unemployment continues to go up, even if at a slower pace. In other words, there is plenty of negative data pouring out, if one only pays attention.
At this point, you may ask yourself: why insist on highlighting the negative and ignoring the positive signs? Shouldn't we be celebrating the improving sentiment? These questions aren't entirely unfounded. The economic cycle is, after all, a self-feeding mechanism to some extent: if sentiment recovers, businesses will plan for higher output, increase investment, hire workers, and so on and so forth. And yet, while confidence is an essential element of recovery, it doesn't actually pay for much. So while consumers may be feeling more bullish, the real question is how much stuff will they be able to buy when all is said and done. And if you think about the fact that much of the spending in the last decade was driven by a massive expansion of credit – which is unlikely to make a comeback soon, I have to wonder what the true buying power of Americans – and people around the globe – will be when the dust settles. Put bluntly, without credit cards, how many millions of people will find it essential in the future to get the latest iPod every 6 months?
And so, while it would be nice if this jolly spring became the foundation for the next boom, I am finding it difficult to ignore all the signs that tell us otherwise. What's more, the precedents are not very encouraging: even during the Great Depression the economy did not fall apart immediately. After the initial drop, there was a brief period of recovery during which the market rallied 50%, only to start an extended decline during which stocks lost 80% of their value. And while I am nowhere near making that kind of prediction, when I look around today and see everyone dancing again, I fear how surprised everyone will be when the music stops.





